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The European Community at the Crossroads*
I. Introduction
The European Community (EC) is in a mess.
Politically, the cohesion among member governments is
weak, the creation of a European Union, which for many
was the leading idea in the shaping of the Treaty of Rome
twenty-five years ago, is more remote than ever, and the
capacity to exert a strong influence on international
affairs remains small.
Economically, the EC is plagued by recurrent budgetary
problems, it wavers between keeping open to the world
economy and retreating into protectionism, and it actively
spins the carrousel of market interventions and carteli-
zation.
Institutionally, there have continuously been quarrels
between the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the
European Parliament about the aims of the EC and the
. means to achieve them, whereas an alarming excess capacity
in bureaucracy has emerged which leaves much time for
administering itself and for working out unnecessarily
complicated regulations, and which stimulate the quest
for more responsibilities at the supra-national level.
One cannot help feeling that much of the present integra-
tion in Europe is due to inertia rather than to conviction.
It is more the rule than the exception that the Council of
Ministers (or of Heads of State or Government) rests content
*
Revised version of a lecture delivered at the Sixth Annual
Conference on "The EEC and the World Economy" of the Royal
Irish Academy on 17-18 November 1983 in Dublin.- 2 -
with agreements at the level of the lowest common
denominator, inefficient as they may be.
According to a widely held view the difficulties which
the EC is facing are to be seen against the background of
the slowness of economic growth and the soaring unemployment
in the member states (as in the industrial world as a whole)
which has persisted since the early seventies. This amounts
to saying that achievements in the integration process are
only conceivable in a period of spreading and lasting pros-
perity, and that basically the Community is not a community
at all but a group of nation states, each of which sticks to
its own "national interests" (as they are perceived) and
pursues them, if necessary, at the expense of others. In
such a case it becomes difficult to understand the raison
d'etre of the EC. Each of the countries could reap the bene-
fits of greater markets and specialization by opening up its
economy to international trade and factor movements to the
extent considered appropriate. The integration process then
would develop along with the deepening of the international
division of labour between countries. This would not, of
course, prevent governments from resorting to some type of
beggar-my-neighbour policies in case of domestic economic
problems. But at least it would push bureaucracy back and
remove the authority for shaping and applying common economic
policies which contradict economic logic about the efficient
use of scarce resources in market-oriented economies.
I shall argue instead that the impasse in the EC has much
deeper roots . They are related to constitutional weaknesses
as well as to incorrect assignments between the Community
and the member state governments. They already became apparent
in the Community of the Six. The two subsequent enlargements
The presentation draws extensively on J.B. Donges et al.,
The Second Enlargement of the European Community - Adjust-
ment Requirements and Challenges for Policy Reform (Tubingen:
J.C.B. Mohr, 1982, for the Kiel Institute of World Economics)- 3 -
(in 1973 and 1981) have increased the trouble, but mainly
because the new member states had to accept the "acquis
communautaire", however doubtful its value may be in some
cases. The same holds with regard to the incorporation of
Portugal and Spain, which has been negotiated for years,
with an increasingly uncertain outlook. The fact that the
levels of economic development in these countries (and in
Greece as well) are lower than the Community's average might
justify more preocupation among the negotiating parties than
the relative underdevelopment of Italy and Ireland did in
the late fifties and early seventies, respectively. However,
the EC could go along with a greater economic heterogenity
if it were not for the obstinacy of some member state govern-
ments and some Eurocrats to preserve at any costs rules and
policies which evidently are ineffective or distorting but
can be presented to the public as indispensable symbols of
European unity. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the
Regional Development Fund and the European Monetary System
(EMS) are cases in point.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the main factors
causing the impasse which the EC has reached. The next
section examines the lack of consensus of the member states
on the aims of the EC and on the means to achieve them.
Subsequently, this is related to the EC enlargement. Finally,
recommendations will be made on major policy issues in order
to provide a new stimulus to the integration process in
Western Europe.
II. The Road into Deadlock
It is useful to recall that the development of the EC was
based on three principles:
the creation of a common market,- 4 -
the harmonization of economic policies and
the pursuance of financial solidarity.
The two first principles are postulated explicitly in the
founding treaties. The third one results from the objective,
assigned to the EC, to reduce regional inequalities and to
provide for balanced economic growth of the member states.
1. On the Common_Market
Out of these three principles, the former Six found it
easiest to establish the Common Market; it is clear enough
in retrospect that it was very helpful that no further inter-
governmental agreements were required. By implication, the
Common Market was to imply the creation of an international
public good from which each member state could benefit with-
out diminishing the wealth of others and from the use of
which no country could be excluded. On theoretical grounds,
specialization, economies of scale and intensified competi-
tion could be predicted to boost trade, incite investment
and improve efficiency at the micro and macro level.
These expectations were to come true, as the rapid trade
expansion within the Community (predominantly by "trade
creation" rather than "trade diversion") and the sustained
economic growth of the founding member states during the
first fifteen years suggest. Though national economic poli-
cies remained crucial in determining overall economic per-
formance in each country, the Treaty of Rome laid the ground
for reducing foreign trade policy-induced risks for entre-
preneurs, so that expectations on long-term investment
improved and the scope for efficient horizontal and vertical
specialization within the Community widened.
Notwithstanding this achievement, the Six did not manage
to make trade liberalization binding and they were not pre-- 5 -
pared to remove all internal barriers to trade. Tariffs and
quotas were occasionally reimposed on balance-of-payments or
market-disruption grounds. Important non-tariff barriers
were maintained, especially in the form of national technical
standards and norms, of selective public procurement policies,
and of subsidies to domestic industries. A Common Market for
services and factor movements has effectively been thwarted
by protectionist national laws in various areas. Since the
seventies matters have become worse. Open and convert sub-
sidies constitute now a major instrument in distorting trade
flows within the EC; chicanery in customs clearance procedures
spreads; "voluntary" import restraints have come into being;
and the agricultural markets have de facto be renationalized
since 1969 when a system of border taxes and subsidies
(officially called "monetary compensatory amounts") was
introduced with the aim of delinking the "green" exchange
rates from the currencies' market value.
Obviously, once the stock of common actions as laid down
in the founding treaties was exhausted, no new, mutually
acceptable conceptions for moving forward emerged. The new
member countries did not provide any stimulus in this regard
either. The result is that both the Council and the Commission
have degenerated to a producer of. technicalities and an
operator of administrative fine tuning, with an astonishing
neglect of the dangers to which they are exposing the solidity
of the Community.
2. On_PolicY._Harmonization
The lack of consensus among member states is also evident
with regard to the second principle mentioned above - policy
harmonization. Ever since the creation of the Community,
individual governments have adhered to national preference
functions, in particular as between price stability and full
employment, and they have chosen a different policy-mix, in- 6 -
particular with regard to fiscal and monetary policies, even
when the aims were similar. In general, Germany has attached
the highest priority to restraining inflation, whereas France
has been more concerned about avoiding unemployment; in the
other countries the ranking of priorities has varied over
time, depending on which political party was in power.
As long as the national counter-cyclical and basic medium-
term policies are not effectively coordinated and inflation
rates differ, the Community is affected by recurrent balance-
of-payment disequilibria of member states, which call for
exchange rate adjustment. If the national authorities do not
devalue or revalue their currency at the right time and to
the extent needed, considerable distortions in resource
allocation are bound to appear. On the one hand, both export
industries and import substituting activities in countries
with a strong but not appreciating currency will be artific-
ially stimulated; the opposite occurs in countries with a
weak but not depreciating currency. On the other hand, the
member states concerned about price level stability will
import inflation from inflation-prone partner countries
("adjustment inflation") and they will thereby have to put
up with the well-known distortions of investment patterns
which are typically associated with inflation.
The former Six made this experience time and again during
the sixties. By resorting to trade restrictions and foreign-
exchange control in order to alleviate the impact of currency
over- or undervaluation, they created new distortions and
made for increased uncertainty in investment decisions. At
that time, the Council of Ministers thought that a monetary
union should be established (though it is not provided for
by the Treaty of Rome), which would make the adjustment to
balance-of-payments disequilibria smoother (Werner Plan).
But it turned out that no member country was really willing
to satisfy an essential prerequisite for a monetary union to
function under a system of pegged exchange rates: the transfer- 7 -
of national competence over key economic policies to a
Community authority. The "currency snakes" of the seventies
failed for the same reason. Nor will the EMS, which came
into operation early in 1979, be able to force the member
state governments to co-ordinate their economic policies.
The EMS does not provide for sanctions in case of infringing
agreed rules and it creates "moral hazard" through the credit
facilities at preferential terms which the central banks
have to grant to each other in order to defend the peg.
Moreover, its very existence is not assured: each country
can leave the EMS if it feels that its own interests are not
served (the French Government has already made a threat of
withdrawal when the seventh realignment of currency parities
was due in March 1983); and by the same token, countries
need not join it (at present, the United Kingdom and Greece
do not participate). Under such conditions on intergovern-
mental policy coordination in the Community any attempt to
peg the exchange rates among the member country currencies
constitutes a cause of economic disintegration rather than
integration, and gives rise to political conflicts among
member country governments.
3. On Financial_SolidaritY
Things went worse in connection with the application of
the principle of financial solidarity. Originally, the Six
set up this principle with the aim of bringing about redis-
tributional policies at the Community level which reduce
regional differences in income and employment opportunities.
But soon two fundamental weaknesses appeared. One is the
temptation for each member state government to call, in the
pursuit of national objectives, for common policies and
thereby to commit other members to the co-financing of those
policies; this leads to a competition for an expansion of
common policies, irrespectively of whether or not they make
economic sense. The other weakness is the propensity of
politicians, which have to justify before their constituency- 8 -
the undertaking of expenditures, to promise that comparable
benefits will accrue in return ("juste retour" doctrine);
this easily becomes a source of claims on the EC's Common
Budget which exceed budget revenues.
As a matter of fact, intergovernmental quarrels over
common policies and over "fair" burden-sharing has plagued
the Community since the mid-sixties. Most controversies were
and are related, directly and indirectly, to the CAP. This
policy, by choosing price-support measures and purchasing
guarantees to farmers in pursuit of the objective of redis-
tributing income to agriculture, not only has led to plain
waste of resources and has imposed ever-increasing commit-
ments on the Community's budget spending (which by itself is
already a compelling reason for concern), but the CAP also
has ended up with a ranking of income transfers between the
member countries which does not strictly reflect the strength
or the weakness of particular economies. In general, a coun-
try gains the more, the greater it is specialized in produc-
ing highly protected commodities and the more it generates
export surpluses (mainly France), thereby paying less in
terms of import levies than it receives in terms of export
refunds; losers are those member countries which have low
levels of self-sufficiency in food and therefore export
little and depend largely on imports (mainly the United
Kingdom). Equally embarrassing is the fact that Germany,
though a net payer, can improve its transfer balance by
producing surpluses of milk powder and butter; or that the
Netherlands, which have a relatively high per capita income,
receive more transfer payments in terms of agricultural
value added than Italy, whose per capita income is much
lower.
It should be recalled that such implications of the
agrofinancial system already in 1965 provoked demands by the
Benelux countries to reshape the CAP and to make it less
expensive. These demands and the harsh rejection by the- 9 -
French Government, which temporarily even withdraw from the
Council ("empty chair" policy), plunged the EC into its
first institutional crisis. The famous "agreement to
disagree", taken at the Luxembourg Summit in 1966, was then
to prevent any serious reform of the CAP up to now. Meanwhile,
the wealthy Benelux countries have got a positive transfer
balance themselves. After the first enlargement of the Com-
munity it seemed that the United Kingdom would take the
leadership on the road to the needed reforms; but soon it
turned out that the costs of the CAP and its economic dis-
tortions were attacked only rhetorically, while much poli-
tical pressure was exerted in order to obtain relief of
financial contributions ("money-back" policy). As the
British Government - not the British citizens - has had some
success, the Greek Government now tries to play a similar
game though the country already is a net beneficiary of the
CAP-related redistribution within the Community. While the
principle of financial solidarity may be essential for the
member state governments to abide by the founding treaties,
the way it is exercized in practice and the deleterious
economic effects it reveals cannot but discredit the
concept, if not the EC itself.
The experience with the CAP is only one example which shows
that the Community has so far been unable or unwilling to
find meaningful concepts for obtaining financial solidarity.
Inefficient sectoral policies as a means of income redistri-
bution have been applied also in other fields, such as
textiles and clothing (since the early sixties) as well as
steel (since 1977). In both cases the protection of domestic
industries against imports from third countries is the chosen
policy instrument; in the case of the steel industry, which
operates as a cartel, the Commission has also established
minimum prices. As with agriculture, the pursuance of
financial solidarity by means of sectoral protection and
price regulation imposes considerable costs on consumers
within the Community; it perpetuates the structural weakness- 10 -
of the regions in which the ailing industries are concen-
trated; it constitutes a tax on dynamic activities; and it
generates continuous debates among the member countries
about a "fair" distribution of production capacities
(external conflicts apart). Moreover, the resort to sectoral
policies has paved the way for other industries which refuse
to adjust to changing comparative Advantages to claim
Community-wide assistance (on the grounds of "equal treat-
ment") , in which case the Common Market would be eroded
further.
Ill. Problems Associated with Further Enlargement
If substantial reforms are not undertaken, the enlarge-
ment of the EC to a Community of Twelve is likely to exacer-
bate current difficulties. Following their entry to the EC,
Portugal and Spain will behave in the same way as the present
Ten, i.e., they will try to enforce their own interests and
will, if necessary, make use in the Council of the vetoing
power which the unanimity principle confers. The policy-
making process at the Community level will be obstructed
even more than in the past. The new entrants, as their
predecessors, can be expected to insist on financial
solidarity and to request, on this account, the application
of the CAP on their products and the concession of regional
and sectoral aid. The present member states will ask for
some form of compensation for the market losses they may
suffer as a result of the increase in competition (most
notably with respect to agriculture). This inevitably would
lead to new, disintegrating tensions among governments. To
some extent, such conflicts may be "solved" by means of
policies which hurt third countries, thereby provoking
external conflicts.- 11 -
1. Potential_for_Internal_Conflicts
In all probability, the enlargement of the Community will
generate important shifts in comparative advantage (in
addition to those occuring for other reasons). With regard
to manufacturing, the shifts will be especially pronounced
in those "sensitive" areas in which the present Community is
already facing a considerable competitive pressure by low-
priced supplies from third countries. Relatively labour-
intensive products (such as textiles and clothing or shoes
and leather manufactures) as well as standardized capital-
intensive goods (such as steel and ships) are cases in
point. Particularly the Spanish industry has a marked export
potential in these areas. The present member state govern-
ments could find themselves under pressure from the trade-
impacted interest groups to protect them against the new-
comers, either by safeguard provisions or by subsidies. By
yielding to such pressures, the governments would erode the
Common Market further. If restrictions on intra-Community
trade are avoided, there is still the danger that the
absorption of additional supplies from the southern member
countries would be carried out at the expense of third
countries, particularly developing countries, by increasing
the external levels of protection. The current, French-
inspired ideas of taking recourse to a "protectionnisme de
zone" in order to develop new, high-technology industries,
could suit also the interests of the inefficient industries
within the present Community.
Turning to agriculture, shifts in comparative advantage
will result from the fact that the new entrants, though
plagued by several structural and technological constraints,
have a considerable potential for increasing their agri-
cultural production. Nothing in their soil and climate con-
ditions suggest that their farmers will be less responsive
to. price and income incentives within an extended CAP frame-
work than the farmers in the present Community (including- 12 -
Irish farmers after the Republic's accession to the EC). The
competitiveness of the new entrants (particularly of Spain)
is very strong with regard to "Mediterranean" products
(mainly fresh and processed fruit, vegetables, olive oil,
wine), so that farmers in Southern France and Italy will
come under increasing adjustment pressure. This is one of
the reasons why the French Government tries to make the
accession of Spain to the EC as difficult as possible. As to
the "northern" agricultural commodities, the present members
(excluding Greece) will keep a comparative advantage in most
cases, but it is not unreasonable to expect the new entrants
(and in particular Spain once again) becoming serious competi-
tors in specific products such as mutton, lamb, wheat and rice.
On the whole, the degree of self-sufficiency in the EC-12
would presumably be substantially higher than it happened to
be in the EC-6 and EC-9, and overproduction would extend to
further commodities (such as olive oil, peaches and wine),
if the CAP is not fundamentally reformed. CAP expenditures
would soar even faster than they have in the past, whereas
third country suppliers would feel protectionism and trade
diversion more severely than they were used to.
Against the background of shifting comparative advantages
within the enlarged Community redistributional questions
will continue to get a decisive weight in common budgeting.
On the revenue side of the EC budget, present regulations
may burden the new entrants with financial contributions
above their shares in the GDP of EC-12 combined, notably on
account of levies and duties on temperate-zone agricultural
commodities (which traditionally have been supplied to a
large extent by third countries) and of proceeds of the
(still to be implemented) value-added tax (in view of a
relatively high share of consumption in the GDP of the new
entrants). The discrepancy between financial contributions
and shares in the combined GDP would be most pronounced in
the case^of Portugal and least marked in that of Spain, i.e.- 13 -
inversely related to the income levels in the new entrants.
On the expenditure side, the entrants expect to benefit from
CAP spending as well as from assistance under the EC's regional
and social policy to an amount exceeding their financial
contributions. But the substantial increase of EC expenditures
implied by these expectations cannot be achieved within the
present framework of financial resources available for the
Community as these resources are already almost exhausted.
Under these circumstances, the new intergovernmental
conflicts which broke out during the negotiations on the
southern enlargement did not come by surprise. Nor is any ^
new element discernible in the way in which these conflicts
are to be resolved. Instead of imputing the pressing budgetary
problems to ill-conceived common policies (most notably the
CAP), in which case the solution would suggest itself, the
present member state governments still enjoy themselves with
looking for agreements on the lowest common denominator.
They can choose between protracting the negotiations and
opening up new revenue sources, or they can do both.
2. Potential_for_External_Conflicts
The more the Community tries to accomodate new members
within the present institutional and policy framework, the
greater is the prospect that the relations with third coun-
tries will become more complicated. It is not just the danger
of the increased trade protectionism which matters. Equally
disquieting is the possibility that the EC becomes even more
selectively protectionist than it already is. This will not
only hurt other industrialized countries (especially the
United States and Japan), but also, and mainly, the develop-
ing countries.
The existing common preferential arrangements with the
developing countries may undergo considerable erosion. More-- 14 -
over, the prevailing limitations in these arrangements on
free market access are unlikely to be eliminated when the
export potential of the new entrants and the supply capaci-
ties of third country beneficiaries overlap (most notably in
textiles and a variety of "Mediterranean" agricultural com-
modities) . There will be a great temptation to invoke the
application of the so-called graduation principle, by virtue
of which successful suppliers from developing countries
would have to grant reciprocal concessions to EC exports.
Greece, Portugal and Spain, which traditionally have pursued
relatively protectionist trade policies based on non-tariff
measures, may try to induce the Community to freeze selective
ceilings for successful suppliers and to establish as many
new categories of "sensitive" items as necessary to keep
"excessive" imports at bay.
All this is bound to escalate national sensibilities in
the Third World and to aggravate the enduring political
difficulties which the present Community is already facing
in its North-South relations, particularly as most developing
countries cannot effectively retaliate economically. The
next formal opportunity for witnessing clashes might arise
in connection with the third renegotiation of the Lome-Con-
vention (of 1975 and 1979), which has linked the EC to a
group of (at present) 63 African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries. Two aspects should be noted: on the one
hand, as suppliers of bananas, canned fruit and fish as well
as vegetable oils the ACP countries will meet resistance by
the new entrants to granting unconditional duty-free access
to the Common Market; on the other hand, Latin America sup-
pliers which compete with ACP countries but enjoy relatively
liberal access to the Portuguese and Spanish markets (notably
in sugar) hitherto, will be afraid of being displaced from
these markets once the Iberian countries adopt the Lome
provisions. Another area of imminent conflict is the
Community's Global Mediterranean Policy, which was initiated
by the Nine in 1975. The enlargement will jeopardize the EC- 15
tariff concessions to most countries of the Mediterranean
basin, in particular with regard to agricultural products in
which the levels of self-sufficiency will rise considerably.
Israel and Morocco seem to be most vulnerable as suppliers
of oranges, grapefruit and other citrus fruit as well as
raisins and dates; Algeria, Cyprus and Tunisia will be
adversely affected the most as suppliers of wine.
That the CAP, if not fundamentally reformed, will inten-
sify its proven harmful effects on third countries should be
beyond any doubt (in spite of the EC rhetoric putting this
policy in a favourable light). The growth of excess supplies
in combination with the impracticability of storing them
infinitely will lead again and again to new dumping on world
markets, whereas the combination of high internal prices and
import protectionism tends to reduce import demand for food.
World market prices of CAP temperate-zone and "Mediterranean"
products will be depressed under these circumstances. Net
exporting countries then obtain lower foreign-exchange
'receipts than they would under more liberal trade conditions.
Net importing countries, particularly in the Third World,
pay for the availablity of artificially cheaper imported
food (including food aid) with the neglect of the develop-
ment of their own agricultural sector and thus the perpetua-
tion of their dependence on foreign supplies. It should not
pass unnoticed that the CAP, in its present form, increases
the instability of world market prices, which in some third
countries may create balance-of-payment problems and in
others generate investment cycles carrying a considerable
distortion of resources.
IV. The Inexorability of Reforms
If the integration process in Western Europe is to thrive
and if the EC is to reconcile its internal objectives with
its worldwide responsibilities, the Community has to carry- 16 -
out a root-and-branch reform of the institutional framework
as well as of the shaping of common policies. Many proposals
for substantial improvements have been made in the literature
for some time. They have not been seriously discussed at the
political level, however. As so often happens at home, the
Community had to run first into a crisis before politicians
could be urged in the direction of a reform. For many ob-
servers such a powerful crisis is the current financial
squeeze, which the Community now faces (for the first time
in its 25-year history); and when the member state govern-
ments decided at the Stuttgart Summit in June 1983 to meet
the challenge in a constructive way, things seemed to take a
turn for the better. And yet, the course of the many
ministerial meetings which took place recently does not
justify hopes that agreement on a fresh approach to
strengthen the Community will be reached soon, if it is
reached at all. Progress has been negligible so far, the
list of contentious issues is as long as ever, the defense
of "national interests" does not abate; the temptation of
using common policies for redistributing income between
member countries remains great, and some governments (not
only the French) bluntly take the applications of Portugal
and Spain as pretext for putting through their own concep-
tions of the future Community.
The basic principles which should guide the reform are
straightforward. Firstly, the old and new obstacles to the
free movement of goods, services, labour and capital among
EC member countries have to be removed. After all, the
creation of a true Common Market was the original purpose of
the Community. The founding treaties also call for a con-
tribution by the Community to a harmonious development of
world trade. Therefore, the Community also has to find its
way back to a liberal trade policy with regard to third
countries in industry, agriculture and services. A liberal
trade policy does not necessarily mean free trade, but in
any case it requires non-discrimination in trade relations- 17
with non-member countries. A reaffirmation of this principle
i
would make it clear to the new entrants that they could not
be granted long transitional periods (say, ten years and
more) to abolish the existing tariff and other barriers
against imports from EC countries and to reduce protection
against imports from third countries down to EC external
levels, ithereby exposing their economies to greater inter-
national competition; Portugal and Spain could then not
afford to postpone their efforts to undertake the necessary
structural adjustments in production and they would there-
fore not undermine their chances of reaping full advantage
from integration in terms of accelerating economic growth.
Secondly, objectives of income redistribution as envisaged
by the Treaty of Rome should not be striven for by sectoral
policies, nor should price interventions be the chosen in-
strument. A non-tied system of financial transfers from the
wealthier to the poorer member countries, including the new
entrants, would be a more efficient alternative, since
relative prices and thus the allocation of resources would
not be distorted as much. At the same time, the financial
contributions of member countries to the Common Budget
should be based on their relative per capita incomes. For
the rest, income redistribution should be made the respon-
sibility of the member country governments on the grounds
that they then would have to justify the cost to their
national electorates. In this case, the Community would have
to establish "rules of conduct" for such national redistri-
bution policie's in order to prevent the governments from
engaging in un-1-imited aids to specific groups and industries
and thereby distorting competition in the Common Market. If,
for example, regional policy is the chosen instrument for
redistribution, the Community would have to determine the
maximum effective rate of subsidies (including equivalents
of other assistance measures) as well as the maximum share
of a member country's territory which would be entitled to
receive aid. The new entrants would have to adjust downward- 18 -
their expectations about the assistance they may receive
from the Community to promote regional development in their
countries. But they could take advantage of the fact that
transfers become more predictable and that policy conflicts
and the economic costs associated therewith are avoided.
Thirdly, the CAP has to be fundamentally reshaped, so
that it neither leads to overproduction, nor diverts trade
flows both internally and externally, nor escalates budgetary
expenditures at the expense of other Community policies. The
overdue reform would have to eliminate current price supports
and factor subsidies, including the subsidies to destruct,
to denature or to export production surpluses. The proposals
made recently by the Commission in the sense that farmers
should share the costs of disposal of production surpluses
or that production ceiling should be established for the
farmers to receive the price and purchasing guarantees by
the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund do not consti-
tute a sensible reform. As experience with policies on milk
and sugar has shown, there is a strong risk that the Council
of Agriculture Ministers would feel even more willing to
increase the guaranteed prices, as such increases could be
financed easier; overproduction would not disappear. The
same holds if the super-levy on milk, which the Commission
has proposed and which the Irish Government opposes so
strongly, was implemented. Therefore, a strictly market-
oriented price policy has to be pursued instead. Agricultural
prices would-, then reflect worldwide conditions of supply and
demand; the/"risks accompanying price fluctuations would have
to be borne-by the producers (though efficient price-stabili-
zation schemes can cushion these risks). Income targets in
favour of farmers should be pursued by a system of personal
transfers which are delinked from the size of production.
For the new entrants a market-oriented price policy may
appear as less attractive than the CAP in its present form,
but only at first sight. Upon reflection they will come to
realize that there are also advantages: procurement of- 19 -
"northern" agricultural products would be cheaper; a mis-
allocation of resources in their own agriculture could be
avoided; and the contributions to the Common Budget, which
are necessary to finance the CAP, would be lower.
Fourthly, it is essential to improve the division of
labour between the Community and the member state govern-
ments. A good policy for Europe does not require common
policies in an increasing number of areas (as the Commission
claims). In strict economic terms, common policies are an
efficient response whenever technical externalities exist
(the environment or in fisheries, for instance). Common
policies are also necessary to assure the functioning of a
Common Market (trade policy, common technical norms, trans-
port) . But many tasks can be dealt with effectively at the
national level, including the objectives of price level
stabilization (provided that exchange rate among member
countries are made flexible), of employment creation, of
technological innovation and of economic growth. Given the
divergent national preference functions on such goals, any
attempt to shape common policies would only end up with
agreements based on the lowest common denominator and on
compromises which lack internal consistency. This also holds
for the extension of the EC competence to industrial poli-
cies, in particular to promote the development of high-
technology industries, as advocated in some quarters. A
common industrial policy would most likely founder on
disputes over which industries of which member countries had
better ..prospects for growth (every government would like to
see its national industries, and not the foreign ones,
promoted at the Community level); moreover, competition
across the border would be weakened, though competition is
probably the most important factor to enforce success and to
drive away inefficient producers; and finally, the existence
of a common industrial policy would invite lobbying for
protection and other market-distorting interventions in case
of investment project failures. Taking all this into- 20 -
consideration, there is reason to believe that by maintaining
national sovereignty in a variety of policy fields, govern-
ments would be unable to evade their genuine responsibility
for achieving stated objectives. The governments of the new
entrants could not make their citizens expect that entry
into the Community would automatically provide for a
catching-up of their economies with the more advanced member
countries; the conduct of appropriate domestic policies
would remain crucial.
Fifthly, it is imperative that the division of labour
between the Council and the Commission be improved. The
Council should concentrate its activity on consensus building
and policy making; it should not do the work which could be
done by the Commission itself. The role of the Commission
should be strengthened in conformity with the prescription
of the Treaty of Rome, which implies the delegation of
powers to administer and carry out the decisions which the
Council has taken.
Once reforms are considered with a greater breadth of
vision than hitherto, the pressing budgetary problems of the
EC will subside, particularly because the expenditure side
(largely determined by the present CAP) would come under
control. It is important for the reforms to occur, however,
that the current financial squeeze is allowed to generate a
creative urge among the politicians. This means that the
Commission has to manage with the financial resources
actually at its disposal, including the proceeds of up to
1 percent of the member countries' value-added tax (the
amount of which increases every year by about 10 percent).
Proposals to expand the sources of EC's budgetary revenues,
especially those from the value-added tax (increasing the
ceiling to 1.4 percent according to the Commission, to
1.8 percent according to the Greek Government, or to- 21 -
2 percent according to the Irish Government) would, if they
were introduced, indulge the governments in the vain hope
that the EC crisis has been overcome at last.
V. Concluding Remarks ~
This paper has been written around the hypothesis that
the deep problems which the EC presently faces are largely
self-inflicted and should not be hidden by references to the
applications of Portugal and Spain for full membership.
Solving these problems will require much more than technical
adaptations here and there and call for more than solemn
declarations at summits on the virtues of European integra-
tion. The challenge is to undertake genuine reforms. One may
argue that it is not realistic to expect those reforms to be
carried out for the foreseeable future, as most member
country governments continue to regard the Community mainly
as a redistributive machine and, for the rest, are keen to
pursue toughly what they consider to be in their national
interest. In that case the EC will fall into agony, with and
without further enlargement. The comprehensive failure of
the Athens Summit, in December 1983, is a serious warning.